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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROBIN L. HOUGHf
Plaintiff and Respondent
and Cross-Appellant,
PETITION FOR WRIT
OF CERTIORARI

vs.
JOEL E. COLLEY,
Defendant and Appellant
and Cross-Respondent.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Is there substantial competent evidence in the record

that the parties agreed that plaintiff would be required to
only provide all her "time and talents" to the partnership and
that defendant would be required to bear the entire financial
burden, or did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the Trial
Court's Finding No. 6.
2.

Was the distribution of the capital assets in error.

3.

Is the question of the rights of unmarried cohabitat-

ing parties one that should be decided by this Court.

REFERENCE TO OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Court of Appeals1 opinion, contained in a Memorandum
Decision marked "not for publication," is found in the
Appendix.

-1-

JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT
The decision sought to be reviewed was filed July 13,
1988.

An order denying the plaintiff's Petition for Rehearing

was dated and filed July 27, 1988.

By order of this Court the

time for filing this Petition was extended to October 14,
1988.

The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the

decision in this matter by a writ of certiorari pursuant to
Sections 78-2-2(3)(a) and 78-2-2(5), Utah Code Annotated
(1953).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The plaintiff (Miss Hough) originally filed for divorce
alleging that she was the common law wife of the defendant
(Dr. Colley) R. 2-3.

Miss Hough later amended her complaint

to include a claim that a partnership existed between Dr.
Colley and herself.

She asked for an accounting and a dis-

solution of that partnership.

R. 19-37.

Dr. Colley answered

and counterclaimed, denying the existence of both the common
law marriage and the partnership, but alleged that if there
was a partnership he should have judgment against the plaintiff for the amount by which his contributions exceeded hers.
R. 41-49.

At the conclusion of a bench trial, the court dis-

missed plaintiff's claim of a common law marriage, no cause of
action, but found that there was a partnership relating to
certain parcels of real property purchased after the parties

-2-

commenced residing in Utah.

The court determined that Miss

Houghfs obligation to the partnership was to devote all of her
time and talents, but that Dr. Colley was obligated to provide
all of the money.

The court ordered the real property sold

and the proceeds used to pay off some, but not all, of the
mortgages relating to those properties;

the balance of funds

was to be divided equally between the parties.

R. 1082-1083.

The court ordered the partnership terminated and the proceeds
divided as of March 11, 1985, the date of the court's memorandum decision.

R. 938-940 T. Vol, III, p. 11-12.

The court

refused, however, to require that Dr. Colley be reimbursed for
the expenses that he had incurred with relation to the properties between the time that Miss Hough abandoned them and
the date of the court's decision.
Plaintiff and defendant both appealed from the judgment of
the trial court; however, the decision of the District Court
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals by memorandum decision
filed July 13, 1988.
Statement of Facts
Plaintiff and defendant commenced living together in
Galveston, Texas in August, 1971 while both were students at
the University of Texas.

At that time plaintiff was unemploy-

ed and remained so throughout her association with defendant

The only mortgages that were not paid were those relating
to funds borrowed from Dr. Colley's retirement trust.
-3-

in Texas.
utilities.

The parties' arrangement was to share expenses and
T. Vol. I, p. 6-8.

Within a few weeks, however, a
2

sexual relationship developed.

In the spring of 1972, defen-

dant received his medical degree and moved to Philadelphia.
Miss Hough subsequently graduated in occupational therapy and
joined defendant in Philadelphia.

Plaintiff obtained employ-

ment as an occupational therapist, defendant was employed as a
medical doctor.

T. Vol. I, p. 120.

Thereafter, the parties

lived together and pursued their individual careers in
Pennsylvania, Montana,
Utah.

Arkansas and Colorado before coming to

T. Vol, II, p. 105-106.

Defendant arrived in Utah in

December, 1975; plaintiff in early 1976.

While in Utah the

parties continued to pursue their separate careers.
U p . 105, 128, 137, 286.

T. Vo1.

Plaintiff, however, became dissatis-

fied with being an occupational therapist and in the spring of
1978 changed her career to that of a realtor.

She made her

first real estate sale in the "latter part of 1978."
I, p. 70-71.

T. Vo 1.

Since then she has been highly successful in

that field. T. Vol. I, p. 152.

After arriving in Utah, the

parties commenced purchasing real property located primarily
in this state.

The property was originally titled in their

Plaintiff described her relationship with defendant at
that point as "very heated". T. Vol. I, p. 8.

-4-

joint names.

As a general rule, a portion of the purchase

price was borrowed from the retirement trust of defendant's
professional corporation.

T. Vol. II, p. 132, 306; Ex* 94.

The balance of the price was either provided through a
mortgage or a real estate contract.

Although Miss Hough

initially managed some of the Utah properties, a professional
manager was soon hired who assumed the managerial duties.
Vol. I, p. 59.

T.

The parties continued to reside together until

October 30, 1981, when Miss Hough walked out.

Throughout

their association, defendant provided a substantial majority
of the funds.

T. Vol. II, p. 337, 338.

After Miss Hough

left, Dr. Colley made payments on the properties totaling
$146,247.00.

T. Vol. II, p. 172-173.

Plaintiff paid only

$4,200.00, T. Vol. I, p. 173, although during that same period
of time she acquired substantial assets in her own name.

T.

Vol. I, p. 128-130, 135-136, 179-182.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF
WOULD DEVOTE ALL OF HER TIME AND TALENTS TO THE
PROPERTY AND DEFENDANT WOULD CONTRIBUTE MONEY BUT
THAT THEY BOTH WOULD SHARE ON AN EQUAL BASIS IS NOT
SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD.
The trial court's Finding No. 6 was pivotal to its
refusal to order a partnership accounting.

The court's scheme

of distribution was also premised upon that finding.

-5-

Defen-

dant submits, however, that the fundamental elements of Finding No. 6 are not supported by competent evidence in the
record.
A.

The record is devoid of any evidence that the

defendant agreed to assume the entire financial obligation of
the parties.

The defendant is not unmindful of the burden

that he bears on this appeal.
980 (Utah 1986).

Harline v. Campbell, 720 P.2d

Since the matter is eguitable, however, this

Court has greater latitude in its review.

Reed v. Alvey, 610

P.2d 1374, (Utah 1980); Ingram v. Foster, 563 P.2d 181 (Utah
1977).

The determination by the trial court that Dr. Colley

was reguired to shoulder the entire financial obligation of
the partnership while Miss Hough's duties were limited to her
"time and talents" is not supported by competent evidence.

In

fact, it is not supported by any evidence in the record.
In his appeal to the Court of Appeals, Dr. Colley
contended not only that the trial court's Finding No. 6 was in
error, but also that the court erred in determining that a
partnership existed between the parties.

The defendant con-

tended that since a partnership requires the carrying on of a
business for profit, Section 48-1-3, Utah Code Annotated,
there could have been no partnership between the parties since
they were unemployed college students, with no business enterprise, when they lived together in Texas.

-6-

The Court of Appeals

brushed defendant's contention aside and went directly to the
trial court's distribution scheme.

From there it leap frogged

over all of the trial court's findings of fact relating to the
partnership issue, including Finding No. 6, and apparently
assumed that since, in the Court o£ Appeals' opinion, there
was competent evidence to support the trial court's finding of
3
a partnership,
the rest of the trial court's findings must
also be correct.
Because the record in this case is voluminous, it is
doubtful that the Court of Appeals, based upon its ruling,
took the necessary time to read the entire record.

The Court

of Appeals cited to no evidence in the record, and to no
testimony of any of the witnesses, in support of its holding
that there was competent evidence to support Finding No. 6.
The plaintiff herself has never cited to any evidence in the
record that supports the finding by Judge Conder that Dr.
Colley was solely responsible for the entire financial obligation of the partnership.

Defendant submits that the notion

that Miss Hough had no financial obligation to the partnership
was erroneously create by the trial court without any support

Neither Miss Hough, the trial court, or the Court of
Appeals, however, has ever stated when or where the
partnership was created. See T. Vol. Ill, p. 14.

-7-

in the evidence or record of this case.
B.

4

The plaintiff herself did not contend that her

obligation to the partnership was limited to time and talent
only.

Even Miss Hough did not contend that her obligation to

the partnership was limited only to her time and talents.

She

testified repeatedly that her obligation included a financial
commitment.

Referring to the time that the parties were in

Texas, plaintiff testified:
We both contributed everything. We contributed all of our finances, we contributed all
of our timef all of our talent, all of our
efforts. R. Vol. I, p. 41 (emphasis added).
Plaintiff testified that their relationship in Pennsylvania
also included a financial commitment.

Miss Hough stated:

It was our understanding, that all of our
efforts, our financial efforts, our physical
efforts, our intellectual efforts were to be
combined so that we — our unit could grow. T.
Vo1. I, p. 55 (emphasis added).
Regarding their association in Utah, Miss Hough testified:
We committed 100% of everything, our finances,
our mental, physical, emotional efforts up to
the time that we separated. We still had a

Finding No. 6, is also inconsistent with the trial court's
Finding No. 3, wherein it held that each of the parties
committed his or her total time, efforts and talents to
the partnership. Three paragraphs later, however, the
court stated that the obligation of Miss Hough was restricted to all of her time and talents only but that Dr.
Colley was required to assume the entire financial burden.

-8-

tremendous amount of contact after that up
until November, 1982 and still a lot of
financial involvement, talking, but the combination was not what it had been prior to our
separation. Prior to our separation it was
100%. T. Vol. I, p. 175-176 (emphasis added).
Plaintiff also stated that:
We combined all of our income into our
accounts, and all of our efforts, all of our
energies into a common pool. T. Vo1. I, p.
144 (emphasis added).
Plaintiff freely admitted that her agreement with Dr. Colley
required her to contribute all of her finances to their
association.

The record also shows that plaintiff did make

financial contributions, Ex. Ill, clearly refuting any contention that she had no monetary obligation to the partnership.

Plaintiff's own testimony, and the evidence, is clearly

contrary to the trial court's Finding No. 6 and the Court of
Appeals' decision.
C.

Miss Hough's obligation did not change.

Miss

Hough did not contend that her obligation to contribute money
to the partnership ever changed.

When asked, "Did the agree-

ment ever change so far as you understood it?"
responded, "Never."

Miss Hough

T. Vol, I, p. 44. According to plain-

tiff's own testimony, therefore, she had an obligation to
contribute not only her time, efforts, and talents, but her
money as well to her association with Dr. Colley.

In addi-

tion, according to plaintiff, that obligation never changed;
therefore, the court's Finding No. 6 that plaintiff's obliga-

-9-

tion somehow did change and that defendant somehow became
solely obligated to put up all of the money while plaintiff
was relieved from her obligation to contribute her finances
but only had to provide "time and talent", is clearly contrary
to the testimony of both of the parties in this matter is
totally unsupported by the evidence and should have been
reversed by the appellate court.
D.

A distribution of a portion of the capital assets

of the partnership based upon plaintiff's time, talent and
services is error.

The trial court, relying on its disputed

Finding No. 6, refused to order an accounting and determined
that the time and services provided by Miss Hough matched the
hard dollars contributed by Dr. Colley.

The evidence was un-

controverted, however, that Dr. Colley had contributed approximately $228,356 more than Miss Hough during their time
together.

Ex. Ill.

That figure gave Miss Hough credit for

contributions of $101,489, the maximum amount she could have
contributed based upon her income, although she could only
document $61,000 worth of deposits to the parties1 account.
Dr. Colley, on the other hand, had verified contributions in
excess of $394,000.

The court distributed one-half of the

proceeds from the properties to each without regard to the
disparity between the amount of money contributed to the
partnership.

In addition, it left Dr. Colley to repay a sub-

stantial portion of the $104,820.55, that has been borrowed

-10-

from his retirement trust to acquire the properties.
The trial court's dissolution scheme also failed to
reimburse Dr. Colley for the $146,000 he paid on the properties after Miss Hough walked out.

Although it is uncontro-

verted that after that time she provided no time, talents, or
services of any kind relating to the properties.

T. Vol. II,

p. 172-173; Ex. 111.
It follows that since the court's Finding No. 6 was
in error, its distribution scheme based upon that finding is
also erroneous.

If Miss Hough is entitled to any distribution

from the partnership, she is entitled to a share of the profits, only after Dr. Colley's capital contributions have been
returned to him, and the property loans have been repaid.

It

has been stated:
Where one partner has contributed capital and
the other services, the one contributing the
capital is entitled to withdraw its value. 1_
S. Rowley on Partnerships, (2d ed. 1960) p.
453.
Under some circumstances personal services may constitute a
capital contribution to a partnership; however, there must be a
specific agreement to that effect; otherwise, a partner who contributes services is not entitled to share in the capital upon
dissolution.

Schymanski v. Conventz, 674 P.2d 281 (Alaska 1983).

As has been noted elsewhere:
A partner contributing only services and no
capital, is ordinarily entitled to no share of
capital on dissolution, the capital is return-

-11-

ed to the partner supplying it. Tiffany v.
Short, 22 Cal. 2d 531, 139 P.2d 939 (1943).
The partner contributing only services is limited to his share of
the profits of the enterprise as compensation for his services.
Hunter v. Allen, 174 Or. 261, 147 P.2d 213, modified on other
grounds, 148 P.2d 936, (1944).
Generally where one partner contributes the capital of
the firm while another contributes skill and labor, the partner
who made the capital contribution is entitled, on dissolution, to
repayment of such capital before any distribution of profits is
made.

A partner who furnishes no capital, but contributes merely

time, skill and services, is not entitled on dissolution to any
part of the original firm capital, but must look for compensation
for such time and services to a share of the profits.

Vassallo

v. Sexauer, 22 Mich. App. 188, 177 N.W.2d 470 (1970); Bass v.
Daetwyler, 305 S.W.2d 339 (Mo. 1957); Baum v. McBride, 152 Neb.
152, 40 N.W.2d 649 (1950).
In the instant case, the trial court, based upon its
Finding No, 6, failed to require an accounting between the
parties even though Miss Hough specifically requested one.
19-37.

R.

It also failed to determine whether or not there were any

profits to distribute.

The trial court failed to properly apply

the law since Miss Hough's distribution from the partnership,
based upon her time and services, should have been limited to
profits from the partnership only and not to capital contributions.

If Finding No. 6 is upheld, Miss Hough would only be
-12-

entitled to a share of the profits.

If Miss Hough's obligation

to contribute financially to the partnership is recognized then
there cannot be a distribution without a proper accounting.

As

it now stands, however, Miss Hough has received the best of both
worlds; a portion of the partnership's capital without an obligation to contribute to that capital.

Defendant submits that this

is error and is contrary to the evidence of this case and that
the Court of Appeals erred in its affirmance of the distribution
plan.
E.

Even if Finding No. 6 is properf the distribution

scheme is in error and should have been reversed by the Court of
Appeals because plaintiff did not devote all of her time and
talents to the partnership.

According to Finding No. 6, Miss

Hough was obligated to devote all of her time and talents to the
property.

Not only is that finding unsupported by any competent

evidence, the record shows that Miss Hough did not devote any
substantial amount of time to the properties let alone "all" of
her time and talents.

She actively pursued her own career.

Vol. II, p. 105, 137.

She had no idea concerning the cost of

T.

maintenance or the negative cash flow generated by the properties.

T. Vol. I, p. 100-101.

She did not know which, if any, of

the properties she had participated in locating.
68-69.

T. Vol. I, p.

She did not know how much, if any, of her income went

into the property account.
vised the properties.

T. Vol. I, p. 134.

T. Vol. I, p. 59, 71-72.
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A manager superShe provided no

evidence of how much time, if any, she devoted to the properties.
Miss Hough kept monies that she received secret from Dr. Colley.
T. Vol. II, p. 260-261, Ex. 78; T. Vol. I, p. 149-150. After she
left, her efforts were directly exclusively toward the acquisition of personal wealth and gratification.
Ex. 73-76, 86-91, 100-104.

T. Vol. II, p. 313,

She also acquired substantial assets

in her own name rather than supporting the properties.

T. Vo1 I,

p. 128-130; Ex 102-104; T. Vol I, p. 203; Ex. 100-101.

The trial

court's refusal to order an accounting based upon its determination that Dr. Colley's financial investment was matched by Miss
Hough's contribution of all of her time and talents is not supported by the record.

The Court of Appeals' affirmance of that

order is similarly erroneous.
POINT II
THE RIGHTS OF UNMARRIED COHABITORS IN UTAH IS
ONE OF FIRST IMPRESSION AND IS AN IMPORTANT QUESTION
OF STATE LAW WHICH SHOULD BE ADDRESSED BY THIS COURT
The Court of Appeals refused to decide what, if any,
rights or obligations

unmarried cohabitating parties have in

Utah with relation to property acquired and debts incurred during, or as a result of, that cohabitation.
A.
cohabitors.

Partnership law is inapplicable to unmarried
Over the years, various theories have been advanced

in an attempt to adjudicate the rights of unmarried, cohabitating
adults.

The most prominent case is Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d

660, 134 Cal.Rptr. 815, 557 P.2d 106 (1976), wherein the plain-
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tiff alleged an express contract with the defendant contending
that she gave up a lucrative career so that she could provide
domestic services to defendant in exchange for defendant's
promise of support.

In the instant case, however, Miss Hough did

not claim an agreement for future support.

In addition, she

performed none of the traditional wifely duties.

Household

chores were done by a maid, cleaning lady and various other
people.

T. Vol. II, p. 182.

The plaintiff did not assist the

defendant in furthering his medical career.

T. Vol. II, p. 737.

Rather, Miss Hough enhanced her own career through the efforts of
Dr. Colley.

T. Vol. I, p. 70-71, 152; Vol. II, p. 124-125.

In Marvin, the court upheld the claim of an express contract and further stated that the plaintiff could, if she wished,
amend her complaint to also allege an implied agreement of partnership.

In deciding an analogous case, however, the New York

Court of Appeals flatly rejected the implied partnership theory
of Marvin finding it:
to be conceptually so amorphous as practically
to defy equitable enforcement and inconsistent
with the legislative policy enunciated in 1933
when common-law marriages were abolished in
New York. Monroe v. Monroe, 50 N.Y.2d 481,
407 N.E.2d 438 (1980).
In Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 80 N.J. 378, 403 A.2d 903
(1979), the New Jersey court rejected the partnership theory
in a case between unmarried adults who had cohabitated for 15
years but did find an express agreement for future support

-15-

based on the facts of that case.
It was held in Chambers v. Crawford, 150 So. 2d 61
(La. App. 1963), that where the initial motive and purpose of
the parties1 coming together was cohabitation and where such
relationship continued, there was no right of recovery based
upon the theory of a partnership.
Although the trial court found a partnership between
the parties, the application of partnership principles between
unmarried cohabitants has been generally rejected.

See also,

Neild v. Wolfe, III Misc. 2d 994, 445 N.Y.S.2d (1981) (living
together as lovers does not create a partnership re: real
property).
B.

An award to plaintiff is contrary to the public

policy of this state.

In Rehak v. Mathis, 239 Ga. 541, 238

S.E.2d 81 (1977), the alleged "wife" brought an action in
equity for a portion of the property acquired during 18 years
of cohabitation.

Affirming a dismissal by the trial court,

the supreme court stated:
It is well settled that neither a court of law
nor a court of equity will lend its aid to
either party to a contract founded upon an
illegal or immoral consideration . . . The
parties being unmarried and the appellant
having admitted the fact of cohabitation . . .
this would constitute immoral consideration.

Much of that opinion was founded upon the Illinois Court
of Appeals decision in Hewitt v. Hewitt, 380 N.E.2d 454
(111. Ct.App. 1978), which was subsequently reversed by
its supreme court.
-16-

See also, Wellmaker v, Roberts, 213 Ga. 740, 101 S.E.2d 712
(1958).
Miss Hough has admitted that she and the defendant
lived together and that they had sexual intercourse.
I, p. 7, 73-74.

T. Vol.

She further admitted that the "agreement" to

become "partners" was arrived at after they started living
together.

T. Vol. I, p. 193.

It appears, therefore, that

plaintiff's claim is similarly based on immoral consideration
and should have been dismissed.

Another case in point is

Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 111. 2d 49, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (1979).
There the Illinois Supreme Court discussed the various
philosophies of the case of Marvin v. Marvin, supra.

In

Hewitt, the plaintiff was an unmarried mother of three who
sued the children's father, with whom she had lived for 15
years, to recover an equal share of the property accumulated
by the parties during that period.

Unlike the instant case,

the plaintiff there claimed that she had devoted her efforts
to the defendant's professional education and the establishment of his practice.

The Illinois Supreme Court, neverthe-

less, held that the woman's claim was unenforceable for the
reason that it contravened the public policy of the state
which disfavored the grant of mutually enforceable property
rights to knowingly unmarried cohabitants.

The Illinois court

stated that public policy disfavored private contractual alternatives to marriage.

The Illinois court criticized the

-17-

approach utilized by the California court in Marvin and stated
that the issue of whether property rights accrued to unmarried
cohabitants cannot be regarded realistically as merely a contract law problem:
There are major public policy questions
involved in determining whether, under what
circumstances, and to what extent it is
desirable to accord some type of legal status
to claims arising from such relationships. Of
substantially greater importance than the
rights of the immediate parties,- is the impact
of such recognition upon our society and the
institution of marriage. Id. at 1207. 6
Further the court stated that, with relation to
Marvin:
it would seem more candid to acknowledge the
return of varying forms of common law marriage
then to continue displaying the naivete we
believe involved in the assertion that there
are involved in these relationships contracts
separate and independent from the sexual
activity.
Id. at 1209.
Continuing the court stated:
the issue, realistically, is whether it is
appropriate for this Court to grant a legal
status to a private arrangement substituting
for the institution of marriage sanctioned by
the state. Id.

The Court was concerned that if legal rights closely
resembling those arising from conventional marriages can
be acquired by those who deliberately choose to enter
into illicit or meritorious relationships, the formation
of such relationships might be encouraged and that might
weaken the marriage foundation of our family based
society.

-18-

The state of Utah is a strong family based society
and has a firm policy favoring marriage.

In Hilton v*

Roylance, 25 Utah 129, 69 P. 660 (1902), this Court observed
that "marriage is the foundation of civilization and of the
social system." Id. at 663.

Although leniency is often shown

to unmarried "spouses" in workman's compensation cases in
other jurisdictions, See, H. Clark, Law of Domestic Relations,
p. 50, (1968), this Court has consistently refused to do so.
Crenshaw v. Industrial Comm., 712 P.2d 245 (Utah 1985);
Wengert v. Double 00 Hot Shot, 657 P.2d 1343 (Utah 1983). 7
It is thus apparent that the state of Utah has consistently
asserted a strong interest in the institution of marriage and
of the family.

See, In re: Goalen, 30 Utah 2d 27, 572 P.2d

1028 (1973), Hilton v. Roylance, supra.

It would be inappro-

priate, based upon the public policy of this state, to afford
legal status to claims arising from a meretricious relationship.

This Court stated that it has consistently held that a
valid marriage is a prerequisite to receiving worker's
death benefits.
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CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial court's
judgment in this case.

There is no evidence to support the

trial court's Finding No. 6 that defendant had to bear the
entire financial obligation of the parties while plaintiff was
only required to provide "time and talents".

The plaintiff's

testimony and the evidence clearly refutes that contention.
If Finding No. 6 falls, the Court's distribution scheme based
upon that finding, must also fail.

Any award to plaintiff

based upon her meretricious relation with defendant is contrary to the public policy of this state.

This Court should

grant certiorari so that it can correct the erroneous ruling
by the Court of Appeals.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of October, 1988.

J. THOMAS BOWEN
Attorney for Appellant
1020 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I hereby certify that on this

day of October, 1988,

I hand-delivered four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing, PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI, to Bert L. Dart, DART,
ADAMSON & KASTING, 310 South Main, Suite 1330, Salt Lake City,
Utah

84101.
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Robin L. Hough,
Plaintiff, Respondent and
Cross-Appellant,

OPINION
(Not For Publication)

v.
Joel E. Colley,

Case No. 880123-CA

Defendant, Appellant and
Cross-Respondent.
Before Judges Bench, Garff and Orme.

BENCH, Judge:
Plaintiff and defendant both appeal from a judgment of
the trial court dismissing plaintiff's claim for divorce of an
alleged common-law marriage and dissolving a partnership the
court found existed between the parties. We affirm.
Plaintiff Robin Hough and defendant Joel Colley met in
August 1972 while students at the University of Texas in
Galveston, Texas. Defendant was in his last year of medical
school and plaintiff was majoring in occupational therapy.
They began living together solely to share expenses and
utilities, but shortly thereafter developed an emotional,
sexual relationship. Defendant graduated in the spring of 1973
and moved to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania to complete a one-year
internship. Plaintiff moved to Indianapolis to complete a
required six-week externship prior to graduation. Once
plaintiff completed her externship, she joined defendant in
Pennsylvania and obtained employment as an occupational
therapist. The parties pooled their resources and opened a
joint checking account, but also maintained separate
professional accounts.

A-l

In the summer of 1974, when defendant completed his
internship, the parties moved to Hot Springs, Montana where
defendant operated a private practice. The parties purchased a
home while in Montana. After a few months, they moved to
Arkansas. Inraid-1975,they moved to Colorado where defendant
enrolled in an anesthesiology residency program and plaintiff
became employed as director of occupational therapy at a local
hospital. The parties purchased a home in Colorado.
In December 1975, defendant transferred to the University
of Utah to complete his residency in anesthesiology. Plaintiff
followed in early 1976, and found employment as director of
occupational therapy at Holy Cross Hospital. In September
1978, plaintiff made a career change to real estate. She
enjoyed substantial success as a realtor, and began purchasing
parcels of real estate, generally in both parties* names, but
using defendant's professional retirement account funds for
down payments.
The parties separated in October 1981, and plaintiff
filed this action in June 1982. In her complaint, plaintiff
alleged she and defendant were married in Galveston on August.
24, 1972. She requested a divorce and an equitable division of
their property. Plaintiff amended her complaint in June 1983;
alleging the parties lived together as husband and wife in
Texas, Pennsylvania, Montana, Colorado, and Utah. She also,
alleged they purchased their several properties under a
partnership agreement and sought an accounting and dissolution*
of the partnership. In an amendment to her amended complaint,
filed in January 1985, plaintiff alleged the parties cohabited
in Texas, Pennsylvania, Montana, and Colorado with the
understanding and agreement they became married at common law
in each state. In his answer and counterclaim, defendant
denied the existence of any marriage or partnership. In the •
event the court found a partnership existed, he counterclaimed
for a return of his capital contributions.
Trial was held on February 6 and 7, 1985. In his
findings, conclusions, and judgment, the trial court dismissed
with prejudice plaintiffs claim of a common-law marriage. The
court found a partnership existed regarding the properties
purchased in Utah. The court ordered the properties sold, all
mortgages and other third-party obligations paid, and the net
proceeds divided equally between the parties.
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On appeal, plaintiff argues the court erred in finding no
common-law marriage. We will not disturb the findings of the
trial court unless they are clearly erroneous. Utah R. Civ. P.
52(a).
Colorado, Montana, Pennsylvania,, and Texas all recognize
common-law marriages. See, e.g., People v. Lucero, 707 P.2d
1040 (Colo. App. 1985); Hurley v. Hurley, 721 P.2d 1279 (Mont.
1986); In re Cumminas Estate, 330 Pa. Super. 255, 479 A.2d 537
(1984); Salavandia v. State, 651 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. Ct. App.
1983). Three elements, common to each state, must be shown to
establish a common-law marriage: 1) an agreement to marry; 2)
cohabitation as husband and wife; and 3) public reputation as
husband and wife.
The trial court found, "[The parties] did not agree
between themselves to be married and did not sufficiently hold
themselves out to the public as husband and wife to meet the
requirements of a common law marriage." Although disputed,
defendant presented substantial, competent evidence at trial to
support the trial court's findings. The findings underlying
the conclusion of no common-law marriage are not clearly
erroneous and are therefore affirmed. Sather v. Pitcher, 748
P.2d 191 (Utah App. 1987).
Defendant argues the trial court erred in finding a
partnership existed and in its distribution of the alleged
partnership's assets. A partnership is defined as "an
association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a
business for profit." Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-3 (1981). Utah
Code Ann. § 48-1-37(2) (1981) provides:
In settling accounts between the partners
after dissolution the following rules
shall be observed, subject to any
agreement to the contrary: The
liabilities of the partnership shall rank
in order of payment, as follows:
(a) Those owing to creditors other
than partners.
(b) Those owing to partners other
than for capital and profits.
(c) Those owing to partners in
respect of capital.

880123-CA
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(d) Those owing to partners in
respect of profits.
(Emphasis added.) Defendant claims he and plaintiff were not
associated in a business for profit. Even assuming a
partnership existed, defendant contends the court erred in not
first returning to him his capital contributions.
The trial court found:
[T]he parties were partners with an agreed
understanding that they would share
equally in all the property and the
proceeds thereon. It was understood and
agreed that the plaintiff would devote all
her time and talents to the property and
defendant would contribute money but that
both would share on an equal basis.
•

• .

[A]ny mortgages signed by both parties for
monies loaned by defendant's profit
sharing plan . . . are to be recognized
as valid. If there are mortgages signed
only by the defendant, the court finds
they are self-serving and do not
constitute liabilities against the
partnership assets.
. . .

[A]ny contributions made by either of the
parties • • . should be deemed part of
their common effort and matched by the
efforts and services of the other party
for which no further accounting should be
required.
Any funds put into the partnership by the
defendant were capital contributions
matched by the efforts of plaintiff.
Although disputed, plaintiff presented substantial, competent
evidence at trial to support the court's findings. The trial
court's finding of a partnership is not clearly erroneous and
is therefore affirmed. Given the court's finding of an express
agreement to "share equally,* which is also supported by
sufficient evidence, the distribution scheme of section

880123-CA
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48-1-37(2) is inapplicable and the court's distribution of the
partnership assets is not clearly erroneous.

The judgment is affirmed.

No costs awarded.

Russell W. Bench/ Judge
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PILED
UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS

Robin L. Hough,

71988

ORDER

i*f to* Court
i Graft of Appeal*

Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.

No.

880123-CA

Joel E. Colley,
Defendant and Appellant.

This matter is before the Court upon a Petition for
Rehearing filed by the appellant.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appellant's petition for
rehearing is denied.
FOR THE COURT:

Mary
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ROBIN L. HOUGH,
Memorandum Decision

Plaintiff,

Civil No. D82-3064

vs
JOEL E. COLLEY,
Defendant•

This mmttmr was tried before the court
1983.

on

February

6,

Written arguments have been submitted by each counsel.

Both counsel have done an exhaustive job in

researching

the

law and an excellent job in presenting the facts.
The parties
Texas,

in

commenced

August»

1972.

living
Both

together
were

students

initially that they could share expenses and
living together.

save

Galveston,
and

found

money

by

They grew up in an era when living together

was a vogue among many young people.
his

in

The defendant

obtained

medical degree and they moved from Texas to Pennsylvania

to Montana to Colorado mnd to Utah.
states

except

Utah

All

of

the

foregoing

recognize a "common law marriage1'.

first issue before the court

is

whether

the

parties

The
have

formed a common law marriage in any one of the jurisdictions.
The elements of such a m^rrirnqm mppmmr to
the

same

in

each

of

be

substantially

these jurisdictions, namely,. (1) the

parties must have agreed between themselves
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to

be

married;
r

^o:rB

(2)

after such an agreement th#y must have lived together as

man and wife) and <3> they must have held themselves
the public as man and wife.

to

Certainlv, in this case there is

no doubt that they lived together
court

out

as

man

and

wife.

This

finds that the plaintiff has failed to meet the burden

of proof as to the other two

elements

and

therefore

holds

that there is no common law marriage.
During their "relationship" the
substantial

real

parties

estate here in Utah.

have

acquired

The court finds that

as to this property the parties were partners with an
understanding
property.

that

they

agreed

were sharing equally in all of the

It was understood and agreed

that

the

plaintiff

would devote her time and talent to the property and that the
defendant would contribute money but that
50-50.

The

both

would

share

partnership property consists of the following!

(1) 780 Northcliffe; (2) contract receivable on 1358 Roberta;
<3>

382

Leslie*

(4) 520 - 9th Avenue*

<5> Dmmr valley lot?

(6) 231 Browning| (7) 514 East Wilson* 770
(8)

South

7th

East;

Flatfheadv Montana) <9) Hot Springs, Montana) (10) Nephi

land) and (11) Spring Creek property.

As to all other assets

the court finds that the parties acquired these in their sole
and separate property.
into

these

The court finds that

properties

by

the

any

defendant

contributions matched by the efforts of the

funds

were

put

capital

plaintiff.

All

of these properties should be liquidated and after paying any
obligations to third

parties

the

divided equally between the parties.

net

proceeds

should

be

Under these circumstances neither

attorney's

fees

nor

costs should be awarded to either party.
Dated this i „ „

day of March, 1985.

Dean E^ Conder,
District Judge.
Copies o-f the foregoing to be mailed to each cou
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBIN L. HOUGH,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,

CIVIL NO. D 82-3064

VS.
JOEL E. COLLEY,

Hon. Dean E. Conder
Defendant.

The

above-entitled

on

the

in

person

ing

in

nesses
and

6th,

7th

on

regularly

for

trial

and by her attorney, B. L. Dart, and defendant appear-

person

and

including

exhibits

by

the

having

and

submitted,

briefs

and

having

having

been

the

came

and 8th of February, 1985, plaintiff appearing

argued

of

matter

attorney, J. Thomas Bowen, and wit-

parties
been

having

received

and

entered

further

Memorandum

his

been sworn and testified,
and

the matter having been

the Court having received post-trial
its

argument
Decision,

Memorandum

Decision, and there

on the interpretation and content
the Court now being fully advised,

hereby makes the following!
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.
Texas,
and

The
in

money

parties

August

commenced

1972.

living

together

in Galveston,

Both were students and sheared expenses

by living together.

They moved from Texas to Pennsyl-

vania, to Montana, to Colorado and to Utah.

All the foregoing

n*
A-10
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states

except

resided

with

Utah

recognizes common law marriage.

each

other

until

late

October,

The parties

1981, when they

separated.

his
a

2.

During

last

year

one-year

two
of

of

of

Colorado

and

the

and

themselves
selves

quirements

in

to

be

to
of

a

her

of

public

common

at

Utah.

together,

filed

They

did

the

During

degree

as

law

of Pennsylvania, and

college

and

completed

the University of Texas,

University

property.

married

the

at

defendant

anesthesiology

lived

purchased

out

the

University

parties

period,

school

at

obtained

The

returns

medical

residency

plaintiff

Therapy.

nine-year

internship

years

the

the

did

in

University
this

time

Occupational

joint income tax
not

agree between

not sufficiently hold them-

husband and wife to meet the re-

marriage.

The

court

finds that

there was no common law marriage between these parties.
3.

During

substantial
property,

real
the

circumstances
total

tions

court

is

filed

the

state

finds

the

parties

and

further

the

in

each

effort

purchased
they

relationship,

estate

where

time,

partnership
parties

their

of

the

talents

evidenced

the

properties

for

fidelity

parties have acquired

of

Utah and as to this

were

parties
to
by
and

bonds

under

committed his or her

the

partnership.

the

manner

held
in

partners

This

in which the

title and applica-

which they reflected

their common ownership.
4.

The

parties

ceased

residing

1981.

A-ll

together

on October 30,

5*

On

divorce.
also
and

July

In

30#

June,

alleged

1983,

that

defendant

1982,

a

plaintiLC

plaintiff

partnership

filed

amended

this

action for

her complaint and

existed

between

plaintiff

which partnership plaintiff requested be dissolved

and that the assets of the partnership be equitably distributed.
6.
of

the

The

court

parties

finds

that

hereinafter

set

as

to the real estate holdings

forth

in

the

next following

paragraph,

the parties were partners with an agreed understanding

that

would

they

share

proceeds thereon.
would

devote

defendant

in

all

the

property

and the

It was understood and agreed that the plaintiff

all

would

equally

her

time

contribute

and

talents

money

but

to

that

the
both

property and
would

share

on an equal basis.
7.

The partnership property consists of the following:
a.
b.

780 Northcliffe, Salt Lake City, Utah;
Contract

receivable

at

1358

Roberta,

Salt Lake

City, Utah*
c.

382 Leslie, Salt Lake City, Utah;

d.

520 - 9th Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah;

e.

Lot, Deer Valley, Utah;

f.

231 Browning, Salt Lake City, Utah;

g.

514 East Wilson, Salt Lake City, Utah;

h.

770 South 700 East, Salt Lake City, Utah;

i.

Flathead, Montana;

j.

Hot Springs, Montana;

k.

Nephi, Utah;

1.

Spring Creek property.
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As

to

of

the

as

their

a

sole

as

the

and

to

in

acquired

court

finds

separate

properties

partnership
lot

assets

other

parties,

except
a

all

Cuernavaca,

the

parties

property

in

agreement

during the relationship

which

which

Mexico,

and

the

not

a

in partnership

parties

includes

and

acquired these

a

expressly had

half-interest

partnership

in

relating to

a duplex on the west side of Salt Lake City8.

The

signed

by

sharing
to

court

both

plan

be

parties

that

recognized

only

by

and

do

the

further

mortgages

valid.

defendant,

not

that

as

to

any

mortgages

for monies loaned by defendant's profit

said
as

finds

If

the

constitute

and

liabilities thereon are

there

court

are

mortgages

signed

finds they are self-serving

liabilities

against

the

partnership

assets.
9.
to
the
of

the

The

partnership

assets

provided

trial
the

common

of

this

parties
effort

to
and

agreement between the parties relating
in

case,
that

paragraph

and
time

matched

by

7

above terminated upon

any contributions made by either
should
the

be

deemed part of their

efforts and services of the

other party for which no further accounting should be required.
10.

Any

funds

put

into

the

partnership by the defendant

were capital contributions matched by the efforts of plaintiff.
From

the

foregoing

Findings

the following:

A

" 13

of

Fact, the court now makes

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

There

was

no

common law marriage between the parties,

and the parties are not husband and wife.
2.
relating
the

There
to

was

the

Findings
of

a

partnership agreement between the parties

real

properties

of

Fact,

which

the

trial

of

the

time

made

by

either

part

of

their

of

the

set

forth

partnership

this

parties

case,
to

in paragraph 7 of
was

and

that

terminated at

any contributions

time shall be deemed

common effort matched by the efforts and services

of the other party for which no further accounting is required.
3.
after

All

the properties

paying

any

are

obligations

to

ordered
third

to be liquidated and
parties,

net proceeds

are to be divided equally between the parties.
4.
based

Plaintiff's
upon

the

first

existence

cause of action and all other causes
of

a

common

law marriage should be

dismissed.
5#

No

attorney's

fees

or

costs

are

party.

DATED thia

A

' *

day of October, 1985.
BY THE COURT;
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awarded

to either
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBIN L. HOUGH,
Plaintiff,
J U D G M E N T
VS.
CIVIL NO. D 82-3064
JOEL E. COLLEY,
Hon. Dean E. Conder
Defendant.
The
on

the

above-entitled
6th,

7th

matter

came

on

regularly

for

trial

and 8th of February, 1985, plaintiff appearing

in person and by her attorney, B. L- Dart, and defendant appearing
in

person

and

including
exhibits

by

his

the

parties

having

been

and

submitted,

and

having

attorney, J. Thomas Bowen, and witnesses
having

been

sworn

and

testified,

and

received and the matter having been argued

and

the

court having received post-trial briefs

entered

its

Memorandum

been

further

the

Memorandum

and

having

argument

on

the

Decision,

and

Decision,

interpretation

and there having
and

content

of

the court now being fully advised

made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of Law, now, therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.
of

action

Plaintiff's
based

upon

First
the

Cause of Action and all other causes
existence

of

a common law marriage

are hereby dismissed, with prejudice, no cause of action.
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2.
relating
the

There
to

was

the

Findings
of

a

partnership agreement between the parties

real

properties

of

Fact,

which

the

trial

of

the

time

made

by

either

part

of

their

of

the

set

forth

partnership

this

parties

case,
to

was

and

that

in paragraph 7 of
terminated

at

any contributions

time shall be deemed

common effort matched by the efforts and services

of the other party for which no further accounting is required.
3.
after

All

the

properties

are

paying

any

obligations

to

ordered
third

to be liquidated and
parties,

net

proeeds

are to be divided equally between the parties*
4.

No

attorney's

fees

or

costs

are

awarded

party.

DATED this

/

p
6

day of October, 1985.
BY THE COURT;

^^Le^V&to^
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to either

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROBIN L. HOUGH,
Trial Court No. D82-3064
Plaintiff and Respondent
and Cross-Appellant,

Court of Appeals No.
880123-CA
Supreme Court No.

vs.
JOEL E. COLLEY,
Defendant and Appellant
and Cross-Respondent.

ORDER

Based upon defendant's Ex parte Motion and good cause
appearing therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that,
Defendant shall have until 5:00 p.m. on October 14,
1988, to file his Petition for Writ of Certiorari in this matter,
DATED th is

-tfd^

n

day of September, 1988.
/

y?l-a^<-<:.. --(^p
SUPREME COURT JUDGE

22.14

A-I7

